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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Kenneth Fink was indicted on 15 counts of dealing in child pornography (Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1109(4) (1998)) and 15 counts of possessing child pornography (Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1111 (1998)).  Prior to trial, he twice moved to suppress the child 
pornography.  First, he claimed that the search of his computers and electronic storage 
devices was improperly executed as a general search.  He argued that the investigator— 
who had obtained a warrant to search for evidence of then-attorney Fink’s alleged theft of 
client funds—lacked the requisite knowledge of computers to properly target his search 
to that end.  The trial court denied Fink’s motion.  In a second suppression motion, Fink 
argued that the initial search warrant lacked sufficient particularity and was overbroad 
and that there was no probable cause to search his home.  This motion was also denied.  
A jury convicted Fink of all counts set forth in the indictment.  After exhausting his state 
court appeals, and failing to obtain post-conviction relief, Fink filed a petition for federal 
habeas relief.  The District Court denied his claims.  We will affirm.
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I. 
                                              
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. 
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 We write only for the parties and assume their familiarity with the factual and 
procedural history of this case, which are carefully set forth in the District Court’s 
opinion.  See Fink v. Phelps, No. 06-181, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9132 (D. Del. Feb. 4, 
2009).       
Fink first argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to appeal the 
denial of his first suppression motion.  In his detailed and thoughtful opinion, Judge Sleet 
explained his reasons for denying this claim.  See id.   Since we can add little to the 
District Court’s reasoning, we will affirm the order denying habeas relief substantially for 
the reasons set forth in the court’s opinion. 
II. 
Fink next argues that his convictions on 30 separate counts of possessing and 
dealing in child pornography amounted to multiple prosecutions for the same offense in 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The District Court correctly noticed that, when 
it considered this assertion, the Delaware Supreme Court inadvertently analyzed newer 
versions of the state’s child pornography statutes that were not in effect when Fink was 
indicted.  After receiving supplemental briefing from the parties, District Judge Sleet 
nevertheless denied Fink’s Double Jeopardy claim, reasoning that both versions of the 
statutes punish possession of and dealing in child pornography on a per-image, rather 
than per-transaction, basis.   
Appellees now request that we certify to the Delaware Supreme Court the question 
of how the pre-July 2000 versions of the child pornography statutes should be interpreted.  
They reason that this is a purely state law issue that is best decided by the state court.  
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However, like Judge Sleet, we do not believe that certification is necessary in this case.  
First, it is highly unlikely that the question of how to interpret the pre-July 2000 versions 
of the statutes will ever present itself again.  Second, the July 2000 amendments did not 
change the underlying substantive law.  Employing the same method of statutory analysis 
as the Delaware Supreme Court did when it analyzed the newer statutes, Judge Sleet 
correctly concluded that the older versions of the statutes unambiguously prosecuted on a 
per-image basis.  Therefore, we will affirm the judgment for the same reasons set forth in 
Judge Sleet’s opinion.  See Fink v. Phelps, No. 06-181, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51777 (D. 
Del. May 24, 2010).    
